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Before beginning, I want to explain that this chapter is not a guide to elllbodied thinking, 
but rather a critical call to action. It highlights the deep history of ernbodied practice within 
the fields of dance and soma tics ,md outlines the value of embodied thinking within human­
computer interaction (HCI) design and, more specifically, wearable technology (WT) design. 
What this chapter does not do is provide a guide or framework for embodied practice. As 
a practitioner a11d scholar grounded in the fields of dance and sornatics, I argue that ;1 guide 
to embodiment cannot be written in a book. To fully understand embodied thinking, one 
must act, move, and do. Tenns such as embodiment and embodied thinking are often dis­
cussed and analyzed in writing; but if the purpose is to learn how to engage in embodied 
thinking, then the answers will not come from a text. The answers come from movement­
based exploration, active trial-and-error, and improvisation practices crafted to cultivate 
physical attunernent to one's own body. To this end, my "call to action" is for the reader to 
move beyond a text-based understanding of embodiment to active eng;1gernent in embodied 
methodologies. Only then, I argue, can one understand how to apply embodied thinking to 
a design process. 
The use of the term "embodiment" in HCI has dramatic.illy increased since the turn of 
the new century. Following branches of embodied theory that use third-person, empirical 
methods of observation, design practices typically place bodies in the role of the active subject, 
and the researcher in the role of the passive observer (Schiphorst 2008: 67). Somatic tech­
niques and various forms of contemporary dance offer a different perspective on embodi­
ment, placii1g the observer and the subject in one body. As defined by Theda Schiphorst, 
"Somatics techniques are intended to be used 'by the self on the self in order to refine 
knowledge and precision through the use of the human body in action" (2008: 52). Somatics 
techniques such as Laban Movement Analysis, Alexander Technique, Feldenkrais Method, 
Body-Mind Centering, and Bartenieff Fnndament,11s provide methods for engaging in self­
inquiry through movement and action. This first-person approach to embodied thinking 
cultivates knowledge from the e11c111-d11y body. By focusing on self-study, it allows practitioners 
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to build upou their own capacity to move, rather than expecting people to meet a particular 
level of expe1tise ro engage in the practice. 
Contemporary dance applies these techniques in the training of highly tecl111ical or virtuMic 
bodies; however, somatics is often used to help da1Kers unlearn physically harmful, habituated 
movement patterns aud relearn movement that is both healthy and virtuosic. Dance has also 
made its own contributions to embodied thinking by creating practices to engage in collec� 
rive rather than individual exploration. Improvisational forms such as contact improvisation 
(po9tmodem dance), cyphering (urban dance), and various social dance forms place embodied 
thinking within a social context. In this, they provide methods for expanding selt"..knowledge 
into a social framework, giving space for practitioners to understand how their own actions 
affect the actions of others. These improvisational forms primarily exist within their respective 
fields of dauce; however, improvisational techniques have been cultivated for and are ofteu 
practiced by individuals ,vithout prior dauce traiuiug. 
The Ephemeral, Allusive, and In-Between Nature 
of Embodied Thinking 
It is often difficult to put into words, and even harder to justity to politicians, the 
ways in which dance works its magic-the basis of its transfonnative powers. We 
tend as a culture to value only what is tangible and measurable whereas dance is all 
about the ephemeral, the allusive, and the in-between. 
(Clarke 2007: 35) 
The idea of ''t•mbodied thinking" is one that is well understood in the fields of contem­
porary dance and sornatics, but one often difficult to captnre in words on a page. Scholars 
and practitioners have explored many methods of sharing and reflecting upon embodied 
practices in writing; however, these w1itinb" become more of a reflective practice than a hol­
istic account of an embodied experience (Kozel 2007; Bacon 2010 ;  de Lima 2013). Familiar, 
yet constantly changing, embodied thinking is a method of processing our world through 
our moving bodies. Simple enough to define, a written description of "embodied thinking" 
lacks the ability to articulate how embodied thinking is understood in and through ,1 body 
i11 motion. For example, reading step-by-step instructions on how to juggle does uot mean 
one will immediately rnaster the skill. The written instructions provide an initial framework 
for knowing. Action-based exploration teaches one how to juggle. A novice must feel the 
weight of the balls as they are held and learn to coordinate the visual cues of a ball falling 
with the physical sensation of the body aligning for a catch. The muscular exertion of the 
body must be calibrated to toss the ball "just so." All of these skills must be coordinated into 
a finely tuned set of actions that overlap and build upon each other like waves. Each of the 
senses must work in harmony and dynamically adapt to the shifting landscape of the balls in 
motion. 
Now, given that I bring perspective to this terni from the field of dance, it is easy to 
assume that, by "moving body," I refer to a highly active or highly trained, 11irlt.1Mic body (as 
in the example of a juggler). Here, then, is where I wish to trouble perceptions of embodi­
mellt by referring back to my earlier descriptions of soma tics as being t<:>r the c11ery-day body 
and contemporary clance's use of somatics as a means to u11/earn harmful movement patterns. 
Beyond unle,1rni11g, dance also explores embodied thinking as a means to cultiv,1te dancers 
who are highly attuned to a nrnltisensory awareness of their surroundin1,rs. In "Trans­
meaning: Dance as an Embodied Technology of Perception," Cecilia de Lima explores the 
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ways in which dance "works its magic" not through physical spectacle but by processing and 
understanding our world through alJ of the senses: 
In the case of dance, it becomes clear that its particular "teclrnological expenise" is 
not so much to do with virtuosity or the capacity of the body to move, but is more 
about having an improved awareness of movement related to the proprioceptive 
sense. 
(de Lima 2013: 20) 
She goes on to define the propriocepri11c sc,,se through the work of J. J. Gibson (1966, 1979), 
stressing that: (1) perceptive systerns are active m.echanisn1s for receiving different sorts of 
stimulus information from the environment, (2) these diverse perceptive systems function in 
interrelation, and (3) perception is based on the skill to move. 
The ability to dynamically perceive the world is one that is afforded simply by the fact 
that bodies move. The idea of 111oveme11t is often associated with highly visible, volu11rnry 
movements, such as reaching for an ol�ject, sitting, standing, or walking. However, as we 
begin to turn our awareness to the body, it becomes clear that the body is always moving. 
Our heart beats; our chest rises and falls with each breath; our eardrums vibrate; our eyes 
move in their sockets to shift perspective. These micro-movements are highlighted in dance 
artist Steve Paxton's signature piece, "small dance." In this work, the solo dancer stands in 
one place, experiencing the rnicro-shifts of the body as it at�usts in relationship to gravity, 
breath, and other bodily processes (BodyCartography Project 201 l). This piece attunes the 
dancer to the ways iu which our body experiences the world through motio11, reminding 
us that, even as we perceive ourselves as being still, we are moving. It also highlights the 
ease with which we adapt to ongoing stimuli and repetitive actions, removing them from 
the foreground of om conscious. For example, take the fairly common act of walking. Walking 
is a complicated process we learn as children through rigorous trial-and-error. Embodied 
thinking is crncial to this developmental process. Now, as adult5, the act of walking is 
,111 ,1ction upon which we rarely consciously reflect. We walk frequently, but are highly 
desensitized to the act of walking it5elf In dance, we often use walking to engage in embodied 
thinking practices and prompt simple questions such as: 
How do my feet feel upon the floor as l walk? 
What body part(s) are iuitiating or driving my walk? 
What am I seeing, hearing, feeling around me right now? 
How am I walking in relationship to the other people in the room? 
How am [ breathing? 
How am I dynamically organizing my body, and am I comfortable? 
How does my perception of the world change if I change the way I walk by moving 
faster? Slower? Backwards? Sideways? 
The purpose is not to answer these questions, but to open om awareness to our constant :md 
ever-changing state of transformation. These questions foreground our habituated ways of 
moving and help us recognize the many sensations we experience without our conscious 
awareness. 
Tuning into our prop1ioceptive sense not only heightens our self-awareness but also helps 
us understand how we come into contact with our world. Drnwing on Maurice Merleau­
Ponty's idea of "flesh," Susan Kozel writes: 
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The body is a weave of different materialities, the body is a dynamic process, the 
body navigates the world at the intersection of a cluster of languages (verbal, 
physical, archetypal, mnemonic, and unconscious). It is electric, biological, and 
cultural. The body is a pattern of information and the body is both a site and a 
mapping onto sites. Above all, for Merleau-Ponty, bodies are flesh, and flesh is 
more tlun just bodies. 
(Kozel 2007: 33) 
We experience ourselves as anatomical beings, kinesthetic bein!,>s, multisensory bein!,75, 
sociocultural beings, and emotional beings; beings in conversation with space, objects, and 
others-beings who act and are acted upon in the world. The ability to move from a first­
person embodied perspective to an understanding of how this perspective act� upon the world 
is how we learn empathy. In this, so!llatic practitioners argue that somatic and improvisa­
tional techniques are a forrn of "empathetic training." Furthermore, the dynamic flow from 
individual to collective or communal perspectives is how we build ethical relationships with 
ourselves and others both directly through interaction and indirectly through the objects and 
technologies we create (Schiphorst 2008: 65). 
Embodiment and Interaction Design: Moving Beyond 
Rhetoric to Methodology 
The term embodiment, or ernbodied thinking, is one that has been adopted into the language 
of many different practices, includiug interaction design. This is in no small part due to Paul 
Dourish's seminal work, vVliere rhc Actio11 Is: T/1c Founda1ions cf Einb,,died lnremcti,,11s (2001). 
Here, he builds an argument for embodied design by drawing from the fields of tangible 
computing, social computing, and phenomenology. In his sixth chapter, "Moving Toward 
Design," Dourish articulates a framework for embodied design in six principles. While listing 
these principles by no means fully captures their meaning, it does provide a glimpse into the 
nature and value of his work. These principles are: computation is a medium; meaning a1ises 
on multiple levels; users, not designers, create and communicate meaning; users, not designers, 
manage coupling; ernbodied technologies participate in the world they rt>present; and 
embodied iuteractiou turns action into meaning (2001: 155-1.88). Similar to the means by 
which I situate my own argument for action, Donrish clearly states that his book (and any 
desigu theory tt'xt, for that matter) cannot guarantee design success. 111 this, he recognizes 
the value of learniug from design practice as much as from dt>sigu theory. While Dourish's 
principles have been built upon by other researchers in the field (Buchenau & Suri 2000; 
Klemmer, Hartmann, & Takayama 2006; Dj�jadiningrat, Matthews, & Stienstra 2007), this 
work misses one pertinent point: embodiment is not something one achieves merely through 
observation and design. Embodiment is a way e>{bcing. Domish repeatedly refers to embodiment 
as a way of being in, actively engaging with, and coming to understand our world; however, 
when addressing the application of these ideas, the conversation repeatedly turns back to 
instances i11 which a community of users or designers is engaging with the technology. While 
this context-specific articulation of embodiment makes sense for both his research and the 
book's audience, it isolates embodiment into a specific setting, such as the design task at band, 
ultimately detaching it from the broader world in which it exists. In this way, the designers 
are encouraged to "call upon" an embodied way of thinking within the design process; 
however, clear methods for somatic awareness are rarely suggested. Such a focus btings me 
to the following critical statements: (1) embodied thinking is not practiced solely through 
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interaction design, and (2) a designer's understanding of embodiment must move beyond the 
designed interaction. This second point is particularly pertinent as we move forward to a 
discussion of wearable technology (WT). 
A Breakdown in Embodiment: Google Glass 
As a designer, it is feasible to imagine that one can develop a comprehensive understanding 
of how technology meet5 the world when it is permanently fixed in a given environment 
(i.e., a poim of sale terminal in a grocery store). In the case of WT, however, the convenience 
of a fixed environment does not exist. Consider Google Glass, which came to the m,1rket 
with great hype and enthusiasm in early 2(115, but failed to fully take off. In his 2015 keynote 
at South by Southwest (SXSW), Google X's "Captain of Moonshots," Astro Teller, blames 
too rnuch media attention for Google Glass's failure: "The thing that we did not do well, 
that was closer to a failure, is that we al.lowed and sometimes encouraged too much atten­
tion to the program" (Teller 20·15). Later, in the question and answer session, he describes 
his surprise at the backlash of privacy concerns that arose from having a camera on the device: 
'Tm amazed by how sensitively people responded to some of the privacy issues ... When 
someone walks into a bar wearing Glass .. . there are video cameras all over that bar recording 
everything." He goes on to describe how this is not ''really" a conversation about privacy 
because Google Glass is only one of many camerns in the bar. Teller's st,1tements both reveal 
how be devalues an honest concern (i.e., personal privacy) and demonstrate how a single 
component (i.e., the carnera on a pair of Google Glasses) cannot be decoupled from the 
broader world iu which it exists. The voyeuristic nature of the camera comes not only from 
the fact that it is an instrument meant for recording rnoving images but also from the way 
in which it is worn. Permanently facing outward on a moving body, the camera is always at 
eye level, always reminding others that it is there. It roves and seeks out new vantage points 
as its wearer moves, settling to stue directly into the eyes of another during a conversation. 
When people look at someone wearing Google Glass, they do not see two eyes staring back 
at them; they see three. The third eye could be recording everything. It is unblinking, always 
seeking new information; it also feels alive because it is connected to a living being. It cannot 
be put away. It just watches, while some "Glasshole" controls it. 
Google Glass clearly demonstrates the many ways in which an interactive technology can 
fail to recede into the background given the myriad of enviromnents in which it might be 
situated. This is particularly relevant in highly public, social contexts. In the case of privacy, 
Google Glass rubbed up against the world in a way that was most felt by those who were 
proximate to Google Glass wearers, hence the emergence of the derogatory name, Glasshole. 
The discomfort felt by people near technology mers and wearers is a newer phenomenon 
not wholly ,1ccounted for in contemporary HCI design practices. Despite the increased 
production and consumption of portable and wearable devices, design practices still focus 
solely on the user or comrmmity of users, taking little account for those merely within proxi­
mity. Given HCI design does not prioritize or even account for the broader social implications 
of portability and wearability, it is highly unlikely that the social backlash encountered by 
Google Glass wearers would have been discovered 'Within a design studio. Herein lies my 
argument for the embodied practices of soma tics and movement improvisation. 
Embodied practices teach us how to experience the world differently, how to open up 
our thinking to a phenornenological awareness-to a way of knowing that is situated in not 
only experiencing new ideas but also re-experiencing familiar spaces, actions, and interactions 
over and over again as if they were new. Had a Google Glass project member with experience 
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in a somatic practice visited a public space such as a bar or cafe and applied embodied thinking 
(even without wearing the device), it is possible they would have foreseen some of the ways 
in which Google Glass was a foilure, particularly how it would affect those 110/ wearing the 
device. This way of meeting the world decenter, users (and their relationship with the tech­
nology) from being the only valuable subjects of observation. Furthermore, it questions the 
relationship between objects, people, and spaces by asking, "What is happening here? How 
is this space being influenced right now?" rather than, "What slumld be happening here? 
How should people adapt to me and what I make?" This distinction of "is" versus "should" 
is conveyed in many of Dourish's p,;nciples, but perhaps most dearly when he states that 
"the manipulation of meaning and co1-1plinx (or connection that arises during the course of 
an interaction) are primarily the responsibility of users, not of designers" (2001: 172). In 
this, we imabrine users as anyone directly affected by the technology, both those using the 
technology and those proximate to the user. This reimagining of the term "users" expands 
Dourish's principle beyond its original intention and suggests designers are responsible to 
everyo1Je affected by the technology within the design process. Had Teller and his team 
broadened their perspective of user beyond those wearing Google Glass, maybe they would 
have understood that the public's privacy concerns reaUy are about privacy because the user 
made it this way. Different perceptions of privacy are not better or worse, only different. Just 
because people did not respond the way TeUer thought they should have, does not make their 
concerns any less important, real, or meaningful to them. 
Aesthetics and Embodied Agency in the Ever-Evolving 
Wearable Technology Landscape 
As learned from Google Glass, knowing how technology aflects our everyday experience is 
particularly important as we move into the field of WT. Beyond considering the broader 
social implications, I now turn back to our personal experience with WT as it relates to our 
bodies. Once interfaces are worn on bodies, an understanding of how they flow in and out 
of our dynamically shifting embodied experience becomes critical. We come into a different 
relationship with ol�jects once they are worn rather than held. Portable objects (like mobik 
phones) ble1Jd more easily into the din of our everyday experience. They can be put away, 
hidden, and set aside. However, WT comes into a d.iflerent relationship with us. Making 
contact with the flesh and tracking bodily functions in places (e.g., foce, chest, and hips) often 
not touched by others, WT's physical relationship with the body is more intimate than that 
of portable objects, which are primarily operated by hand. Engaging in a multisensory rela­
tionship with intimate, often highly personal spaces of the body, WT thus has a deeper impact 
upon our embodied agency. 
The idea of agency has often been considered apart from a corpor,,l understanding of the 
self, where mental st.1tes are rendered superior to and somehow distinct from embodied states 
(Campbell et al. 2010: 1-2). However, embodied or corporal experience is central to hov,; 
we understand both self and agency, and WT reveals the trouble with separating agency from 
bodies: wearers cannot easily distinguish their self-identity from the technology itself. The 
visual aesthetics, m.ultisensory feedback, and physical materials of devices continuously inter­
weave with a wearer's embodied experience. In this, WT is successful when it gives the user 
control to sh:\pe and define relationships. WT is far less successful, and in fact reduces embodied 
agency, when it acts upon people in ways that demand attention or recognition without 
consent. This reduction or loss of embodied agency can come in many forms, including 
unwekomed and uncontrollable haptic, sonic, or visual cuing; distractingly "loud" visual 
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design; wearer discomfort; and reductiw representations of embodied experiences that do 
not give agency to the user to contextualize the data. Again, if we bro,1den the concept of 
riser to be all those affected by WT, then it is easy to imagine how these unwelcomed intrusions 
can apply to both the wearer and those proximate. 
Issues of embodied agency are heightened when WT is adopted and imposed upon people 
by a company or organization. In 2002, Ana Viseu conducted a case study in which she 
studied Bell Canada field technicians wearing small computers fashioned to fit in shoulder 
bags. Similar to many of today's wearable technologies, the computers handled much of the 
"busywork," such as dispatch, communications, and fieldwork logs, that technicians were 
accustorned to doing. The computers did all of this work, collectii1g considerably more 
information than workers could them5elves and freeing up time for them to do other things. 
This freedom was seen as a means to give workers increased agency within their everyday 
processes, but the actual sentiment among them was that of agency loss (Viseu 2005: 176). 
For instance, the highly organized software system required entry into prescribed fields and 
removed workers' ability to contextualize their notes. The software also removed their ability 
to com:ct mistakes in their work and decreaied the amount of contact they had with their 
managers. These changes fundamentally altered the ,vorkers' self-identity, and the wearable 
computers became a recmring reminder of agency loss. In this scenario, WT allowed workers 
to physically move more naturally and freely within their work environment. In theory, this 
freedom should have improved their embodied experience. However, interaction design 
choices removed almost all embodied agency from the system at hand and left workers with 
devices onto which they could no longer inscribe themselves. 
Since Viseu's experiment in 2002, data tracking through personal wearable devices has 
become nothing less than pervasive. Individual users are now choosing to self-track with WT, 
a behavior revered by the Quantified Self (QS) movement (Quantified Self 2015). Fitbit, for 
example, has become the most popular health- and fitness-tracking device on the market, 
making over 745 million USD in 2014 alone (Park 2014). While it has clearly been embraced 
by some sectors of western culture, its framework looks very similar to that of Bell Canada's 
wearable computers: a wearable/portable device that automatically tracks and logs user 
behavior. The unsettling implications of such devices h,we become more publicly transparent 
now that businesses and insurance companies are partnering with Fitbit to provide "perks" 
to users. Fitbit's corporate wellness program partners with businesses interested in tracking 
the health of their employees and lowering health insurance rates. Health insurance companies, 
such as United Health, Kaiser Foundation Group, Humana Group, and Aetna, are now 
developing perks programs that reward members for tracking and sharing their health data 
(Olson 2014). For instance, Discovery Health's "Vitality" health program offers "Vitality 
Points" to members who wear fitness tracking devices (Bernard 2015). Both Humana Group 
and John Hancock now partner with Vitality to offer similar rewards programs to their 
customers CTohn Hancock Vitality Program 2015; Humana 2016). 
While aiming to shed light on the human exp.:rience, the QS movement compresses 
experience down to a lossy dataset large in size but devoid of critical contextual information. 
This type of tracking may be convenient and rebtively easy to analyze, but it is based on a 
large set of assumptions about what types of behaviors are producing the data and how devices 
are being used. This concern is satirically highlighted in the work of artist�, Tega Brain and 
Surya Mattu. Pushing back on the influx of health promotion programs such as Vitality, Brain 
and Mattll developed U,'!fil Bits: motion-generating devices that "set your data free" by 
connecting Fitbits to metronomes, bicycle tires, ,rnd other repetitive motion objects (Brain 
& Mattu 2015). U1ifit Bits critically push back against the QS movement, dernonstrating the 
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futility and arbitrariness in attempting to harness embodiment with massive quantities of data­
a vital, much needed critique as the QS movement continues to grow. 
While theories in embodied interaction design take us far, they cannot account for the 
value of engaging i11 embodied practices. l11 this, I challenge designers to become agents in 
their owll embodied discovery by engaging in a somatic practice. This work is not easy, neat, 
or quick. Embodied thinking t,1kes time to cultivate. It is difl:icult to artinilate in words, and 
the ways in which it affects om work is not always easy to explicitly understand. The urgency 
to address this challenge has been felt by many in the WT design community for some time 
now. My biggest question as a somatic practitioner and dancer is when and why WT is 
necessary. Furthermore, who has the 1ight to make WT? The inherently pervasive and invasive 
nature of WT means that we need designers who deeply care about these questions and want 
to take responsibility for ways WT affects not only potential users but also broader society. 
The potentially profound sociocultural impact that WT can and is havillg means that designers 
need to cultivate a deep, embodied ethos of care, 011e that recognizes the power of influencing 
people's e1i1bodied agency. 
Cultivating responsible technologies will require a transdisciplinary approach, one in 
which somatics, movement improvisation, experience prototyping, and HCI design practices 
are integrated without predetermined prioritization. Some progress can be made through the 
work of interdisciplinary teams that include somatic practitioners, but I argue that real progress 
will come whe11 all members ofa design team learn to value and engage in embodied thinking. 
In this, I reiterate my call to action: I encourage readers to enrich the theoretical understanding 
of embodiment to one that is experienced through not only words on a page but also the 
bodies with which we are so intimately interconnected. 
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